Palestinian youth: New movement, new borders Palestinian unity agreement only first step in long-term movement, according to Palestinian youth.

Palestinian youth in the West Bank, Gaza and the diaspora are looking to unify and strengthen their identity [GALLO/GETTY] Reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah may present the first victory of a nascent Palestinian youth movement, which earned its moniker, the March 15th movement, from the first day of its mass protests in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Only one day after the launch of their movement demanding an end to the four-year internecine conflict that also divided the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas announced his willingness to travel to Gaza to engage in unity talks, while other leading Fatah members, aware of the youths' potential force, opened twitter accounts just to follow the pulse of the movement. Arguably, the unity government is a preemptive tactic to thwart rising Palestinian discontent, and the increasing relevance of youth protests, in a broader Arab Spring. In fact, on the day of its announcement, Hamas security forces violently dispersed nearly 100 jubilant youth celebrating in Unknown Soldier Square in Gaza for failure to obtain prior approval to congregate. Ibrahim Shikaki, a recent UC Berkeley graduate and Ramallah-based youth organiser comments that Hamas and Fatah have tried to undermine the organisers' efforts by inhibiting media coverage, accusing its leaders of receiving foreign funding and shifting the focus of the protests to the factional division for fear of "losing grip over power and authority". In that case, thawed relations alone will not suffice to quell the budding movement. According to youth leaders, reconciliation is only the first of many demands. The movement which transcends borders, and in some cases, the bounds of qualifying youth age, has its eyes set on rehabilitating the scattered Palestinian national body by holding Palestinian National Council elections that include all Palestinians, regardless of geographic location and circumstance. Its ultimate goal: to reconstruct a Palestinian national programme based upon a comprehensive resistance platform. Palestinian youth's Arab Spring The movement's horizon may render existing political parties meaningless as invigorated youth activists search for creative ways to shatter the stagnation of their domestic condition in an effort to buttress their ongoing struggle against Israeli colonisation. As put by Khaled Entabwe, a Palestinian-Israeli youth leader in Haifa and a coordinator with Baladna, the Association for Arab Youth: "Our new modes of organising include a direct challenge to entrenched institutional power. We do not want to just memorialise the past, but also to demand a new future." Well before the call for the March 15th day of action, Palestinian youth, inspired by revolutionary protests in North Africa, had begun to organise themselves in the global diaspora. In late January, Palestinian students in the UK staged a sit-in in the Palestinian embassy in London and demanded that they, along with all Palestinians wherever they live, "in the homeland, the shatat, in the prisons, and the camps of refuge" be included in an election of a resuscitated Palestinian National Council (PNC). The students deliberately organised themselves as the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) in order to evoke a bygone era of national cohesiveness and, more importantly perhaps, transnational membership in a representative body. According to Rafeef Ziadah, a doctoral candidate and one of the leading organizers of the UK action: Where in the past, Palestinian students would belong to Palestinian political factions and organise within the structures of the General Union of Palestinian Students, these structures are nothing but empty shells today. That is why when we did hold the sit-in at the Palestinian embassy in the UK we insisted on using the name GUPS to take back those institutions meant to represent us. Ziadah explains that the protesters' demands for the inclusion of a global Palestinian national body in an accountable PNC reflects an inevitable moment catalysed by the revelation of the Palestine Papers, coupled with the revolutionary fervour of an Arab Spring. She comments that for several years, Palestinian activists in diaspora had been "wondering what our role is in Palestinian politics beyond solidarity actions". Across the Atlantic, similar discussions instigated the formation of the US Palestinian Community Network in 2006. Established with the aim of empowering the US-based Palestinian community, unifying its voice, and affirming "the right of Palestinians in the Shatat (exile) to participate fully in shaping of [their] joint destiny," the loose national network comprised of nearly a dozen local chapters and an inclusive and fluid leadership, has organised two national popular conferences to date. In its most recent conference in October 2010, the USPCN explicitly encouraged the formation of popular associations, reflecting an effort to revive long-defunct models that had once been the organisational cornerstone of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Factional discord vs unity In late February, the USPCN's DC Chapter staged a protest in front of the PLO General Delegation Office - not just to demand inclusion in a revived PNC election, but for the annulment of Oslo and the termination of the Palestinian Authority (PA), among a longer list of pointed demands. The protesters presented the PA with a pink slip for "failure to uphold its duties as a governing body" and for "acting without proper delegation" in the course of its negotiations with Israel. Reem El-Khatib, a leading member of the USPCN-DC and a communications specialist, acknowledges that while the US-based call is more radical than its counterparts in the OPT and elsewhere, demands for unity and termination of the PA are not in conflict because, "so long as there is corruption in a political representative body, there cannot be a unified stance. Once those who are not truly working for the Palestinian people are dismissed, unity among those who are sincerely working for progress can happen". Organisers from Gaza and the West Bank do not agree - or at least they cannot for localised and pragmatic considerations. Mohammed Majdalawi, an aspiring filmmaker and youth activist from Gaza City notes that factional discord has impeded his group's ability to make more radical demands. Majdalawi explains: Our roof is the occupation and our floor, the political factions. In Gaza, nearly all political demands have been associated with one party or the other. If you demand elections you are accused of supporting Fatah and if you support ending Oslo you appear to be supporting Hamas. So, in order to maintain neutrality and establish a popular position, we have demanded an end to the division. In the West Bank, Huwaida Arraf, co-founder of the International Solidarity Movement and leading member of the Free Gaza Movement, agrees that factional strife has politicised nearly all demands beyond those for unity. She adds that in the West Bank, where the termination of the PA would impact the source of income for thousands of Palestinian families, limiting the movement's demands is a tactical decision. Arraf explains, "in order to generate unity and to rehabilitate trust amongst Palestinians, it makes more sense to forcefully challenge the Israeli occupation to heighten your representative status. So rather than say 'screw you, PA' you are saying 'you've tried, thank you, now follow us'." Youth activists within Israel are doing precisely that. Entabwe points out that within Israel, the annual commemoration of Land Day had become like a wedding ceremony where demonstrators "come to see and be seen, to offer gifts, and go home". This year youth organisers insisted on different tactics and urged responsible political parties to hold the demonstrations in Lydd or the Negev, where Jewish colonial settlement is ongoing, as opposed to its traditional site in Sakhnin. The group could not reach consensus and the idea was scrapped. The youth organised their protest anyway and did so on March 29th so as to avoid overlap with traditional Land Day events on March 30th. Entabwe explains that the independent youth organisers successfully drew thousands of people forcing the resistant Palestinian political parties to join them but that, "not a single political party gave a speech that day which created quite a buzz among political circles". 'Between continents and countries' For Entabwe and his counterparts, limiting the role of traditional political parties is the first of their three agreements, as the youth group has yet to agree on a set of demands. Entabwe elaborates: "We have a new conviction that, this time more than any other, that our work should not be based on party lines - and even if parties are involved, their agendas should be taken out of the meetings and everyone present will participate as an individual. Therefore, all decisions can and will be made at the meetings. We are ending the practice of taking positions 'back to the party'." In Lebanon, Palestinian youth are building a movement that similarly responds to their local context as much as it does to their international condition. Rabih Salah, a youth leader and athletics coach who grew up between Ein El Hilweh, Beirut and Yarmouk, describes a four-pronged political program that predominantly responds to local conditions: 1) an end to the siege of the camps; 2) greater civil and political rights, primarily the right to work; 3) more representative Palestinian leaders of unions, parties, and institutions within Lebanon; and 4) the right to return. Salah explains: "We would like to create a national movement in Lebanon so that we can establish more representative bodies. Within Lebanon, we need to be able to elect local representatives that can represent us internationally. If we don't have locals making the demands for us we won't be able to make any demands at all." While demands and tactics vary between continents and countries, the nascent and global Palestinian youth movement agrees on one thing thus far. As articulated by Shikaki, they seek to hold PNC elections to establish "a body that represents all 10 million Palestinians around the world, and [can] create a national Palestinian strategy". In the immediate short-term, youth organisers globally are preparing for Nakba commemorations on May 15th. In the medium short-term, youth are preparing to respond to the proclamation of a Palestinian state. While those plans are not determined yet, most organisers, such as Arraf - who fear that the two-state frame may confine broader calls for human rights, are skeptical of the statehood strategy all together. In the long-term, the scattered youth groupings seek to meet one another and to build a collective vision. In the words of Entabwe: "I refuse to become a piece of Israeli society with a different path…I am part of the Palestinian solution and my fate is part of a collective fate. We need a representative government to represent all of us." Noura Erekat is a Palestinian human rights attorney and activist. She is currently an adjunct professor at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies in Georgetown University

Previous attempts to form a unity government have ended in fighting and bloodshed [GALLO/GETTY]

Fatah and Hamas have inked a reconciliation pact in Cairo, Egypt, aimed at ending their four-year rift. But it is not the first time the two groups have tried to put their differences aside.
Below is a timeline of key events in the conflict between them.
Jan 25, 2006: Hamas defeats Mahmoud Abbas' long-dominant Fatah party in parliamentary polls.
March: Hamas government sworn in, headed by Ismail Haniyeh, after Fatah refuses to join. Western backers including the US and European Union say Hamas is a "terrorist" organisation and refuse to recognise group as the legitimate winner.
September:  Abbas and Haniyeh announce agreement to form a unity administration, but talks flounder over what the new cabinet's stance will be towards Israel. Abbas's Fatah movement supports a Palestinian state alongside Israel, while Hamas rejects Israel's right to exist. Their disagreements lead to violence on the streets of Gaza.
October: A number of mediation conferences are held. Egypt and Qatar send their foreign ministers to meet with both sides. Other Palestinian groups such as the Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine mediate between the two sides to stop the clashes.
November: Following talks between Hamas and Fatah, both sides agree to form a unity government.
December: Abbas calls for new elections as a solution to the ongoing crisis.
February 2007: Fighting between Hamas and Fatah factions intensifies in Gaza, with Hamas overrunning compounds used by Abbas's security forces. The two sides then agree on a deal in Mecca, in the hope that Western powers will lift crippling sanctions imposed on the Hamas-led government. Haniyeh and his cabinet resign, but he is re-appointed by Abbas and begins the process of forming a new Palestinian unity government.
March: The Palestinian unity government takes office, but Hamas says it will not halt rocket fire against Israel, as proposed by Abbas, after the Jewish state vows to press ahead with its attacks on Gaza.
June: Battle of Gaza begins, resulting in Hamas taking control of the Gaza Strip from Fatah, who stay in control of the occupied West Bank. At least 100 people are killed in the heavy fighting. Abbas dismisses the Palestinian government and declares a state of emergency.
November: George Bush, the then US president, hosts peace talks between Palestinians and Israelis at Annapolis, Maryland, while Hamas still holds control over Gaza.
January 2008: Israel steps up military actions on Gaza and Hamas, killing seven Palestinians. Ehut Olmert, the then Israeli PM, vows to respond to continuing rocket attacks from Gaza. Israel continues incursions into Gaza, leaving Palestinians in a humanitarian crisis without fuel, power, food and water.
December 2008: Israel launches Operation Cast Lead, a full scale invasion of the Gaza Strip in response to rocket attacks by Palestinian armed groups. Some 1,400 Palestinians are killed, many of them civilians. After 22 days of fighting, Israel and Hamas each declare separate unilateral ceasefires.
January 2009: Abbas' term as president ends, but vows to stay in power until parliamentary and presidential elections can be held simultaneously.
February 2009: Egypt pushes Fatah and Hamas to hold reconciliation talks to create a unity government that would allow for simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections.
April 2009: The two groups suspend reconciliation talks for three weeks after failing to agree on a unity government.
September 2010: Round of direct negotiations between the Israeli and Palestinian leadership begins. The talks collapse in the same month after Israel refuses to extend the freeze on settlement construction in the West Bank.
May 3, 2011: Unity deal between Fatah and Hamas signed in attempt to end feud between the two groups, which remain divided between the Gaza Strip and occupied West Bank. The deal involves members of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Islamic Jihad, Popular Resistance Committee and Hamas.

May 4, 2011: Fatah and Hamas leaders, Abbas and Khaled Meshaal, gather in Cairo to mark the reconciliation agreement.

Youth in Palestine finally feel as though their voices are being heard as Hamas and Fatah reconcile. The region has  a real chance for peace, so long as a more receptive Egypt helps it along [EPA] The long-awaited unity deal between Fatah and Hamas is a statement of intent from both parties, and from the deal's sponsor - Egypt. By excluding Israel, they are finally speaking to Israel, and you can tell from the alarmed reactions that the message is being heard loud and clear. Israeli foreign minister (and noted diplomat) Avigdor Lieberman speculated about "hundreds of terrorists" flooding the West Bank. Defence minister Ehud Barak said Israel must use an "iron fist" against this "threat". Tin hats and dark muttering are the order of the day. Before last week's announcement, prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu urged president Abbas to choose Israel, and "peace", over Hamas. But Abbas is already familiar with Israeli peace. His last trip to Egypt for negotiations was with his opposite number, a visit every bit as insincere as the whole sorry process, and ended with a whimper and a new rash of settlements. A new Abbas This time he returns, wreathed in the glow of a genuine achievement that has shocked his own people as much as the Israelis. For once, the Palestinian Authority has put the interests of Palestinians first, and the youth movements who campaigned for national unity finally feel they are being heard. That the rival factions of Fatah and Hamas were able to reach agreement shows their confidence in a new political landscape. To incur the wrath of Israel and the USA may cripple the embryonic economy of the West Bank, and bring fresh misery to besieged Gaza. They are placing their faith in the Arab Spring, and particularly Egypt, to deliver a just peace. It is a gamble, but to pursue US-mediated talks with Israel any longer would have been delusional and self-defeating. Riding the crest of its own wave, Egypt is a good ally to have at the moment. Their status is restored as the Arab world's most powerful voice, and the Palestinian issue has assumed priority status surprisingly quickly after the revolution. A new attitude to the conflict is developing, exemplified by new foreign minister Nabil el-Arabi's recent statement: "It is time to stop managing the [Israeli-Palestinian] conflict, it's time to end it." That commitment has already been demonstrated by successfully bringing the Palestinian factions together after years of hostility. The agreement is more symbolic than practical, yet it still required Hamas to tacitly endorse engagement with Israel, and Egyptian involvement with Gaza's internal security. Egyptian mediators recognised the unique opportunity granted by the wave of Arab uprisings; with Hamas weakened by the deterioration in Syria, and Abbas down an ally with the loss of Mubarak, the middlemen in Cairo were shrewd enough to exploit the shared need for new direction. Egypt has its own reasons to pressure Israel. To implement the reforms demanded by the revolution, it must revise its relations with the Jewish state. Under Sadat and Mubarak, Israel enjoyed preferential trade agreements that include gas deals worth US$700million more than the current contract. Egyptian politicians have been publicly asserting that they are under no obligation to maintain this disadvantageous agreement, and with the urgent need to introduce a minimum wage, welfare and greater social equality, the country cannot afford it. Should Israel's most essential imports be threatened, that vulnerability will strengthen the Palestinians' hand. Ending the siege On the Egyptian street, the clamour grows louder by the day. Palestinian liberation has found its way on to the agendas of parties across the political spectrum: right and left, new and old, religious and secular. Israeli flags burn in Tahrir Square, and the speeches which emphasise solidarity with Palestinians are cheered the loudest. When thousands march to Gaza on Nakba day, May 15th,  it will be the closest the Arab wave has yet come to lapping at Israel's shores. All signs indicate Egypt will continue to make Israel feel the cold. Already their foreign ministry has broken from Mubarak policy by supporting a unilaterally declared Palestinian state and demanding that the US follow suit. More significantly, they can open the Rafah border and end Israel's siege of Gaza. Such a move would at a stroke remove a cornerstone of Israeli security policy, weakening their control and exposing them to even harsher international condemnation for the glaring disregard for human rights in the Strip. Such a move would present problems for Egypt too, but official statements indicate it is a case of when, rather than if, the Rafah border will be opened. How will Israel react? Beyond the hysterical rhetoric, they have already taken concrete steps, withholding an $89million tax payment to the PA which will leave many state employees unpaid. They will hope the withdrawal of support will severely affect their long-time allies, who have become "terrorists" again at a stroke. Beyond disengaging with Palestinians, Israel will likely reduce involvement with the whole Arab region and rely even more heavily on US support. They are lobbying the Quartet to thwart recognition of the unity government or a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood. It will work on the US, which will continue to veto any resolution that would negatively affect Israel, and the White House has already condemned the reconciliation treaty. The UN and EU may prove harder to convince. EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton has been a vocal critic of Israel's occupation and siege, while the latest UN Security Council resolution condemning West Bank settlements was unanimous, save for the US veto. The Quartet's planned talks for April have been postponed but US protection of Israel will certainly receive a stern examination. Choosing a new path Having finally cast off US-Israeli sham brokerage and taken a decisive step by themselves, the Palestinian factions must wait while external powers dispute their fate. Their task now is to maintain the uneasy alliance, which will ask searching questions. Hamas insist that un-elected prime minister Salam Fayyad stand down, while Fatah will have problems releasing the thousands of Hamas prisoners they now hold. The issue of recognising Israel should prove less of a stumbling block. Hamas members were party to the 1993 PLO formal recognition announcement and the demand will likely be removed if a genuine offer is on the table. Neither should they have a problem renouncing violence, given their history of honouring ceasefires. Israeli ministers have indicated they would consider engaging with Hamas should those demands be met. They too have been granted new options by the Arab Spring. Should their siege of Gaza collapse with the removal of Egyptian participation, and their impunity be weakened by international support for a united, independent Palestinian state, there is an escape route that would deliver security and legitimacy. The Arab League's long-standing offer to Israel – full, normalised relations with all Arab states in exchange for the return of all territories occupied since 1967 – would finally make Israel a part of the Middle East. Instead of fearing the rise of democracy in the region, they must welcome it and seize the opportunity for a fresh start. The alternative is to remain a pariah state while their allies drop away, and a level of isolation they cannot sustain. With the Cairo agreement, Egypt has set the ball rolling.